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Abstract  
Regionalism has been conceptualised as a development strategy for integrating developing 
countries into the global economy, and there has been an increase in the number of North-
South regional trade agreements (RTAs) being negotiated among WTO Members. Notified 
under Article XXIV GATT 1994, members of North-South RTAs must liberalize substantially 
all trade on a reciprocal basis, within a reasonable period of time, irrespective of their 
development status. Challenging the assumptions on which North-South regionalism rests, this 
article submits that Article XXIV has created a regulatory framework that sustains a 
monocultural conception of development which is synonymous with economic growth. 
Rejecting the economic model, this article argues that development should be understood as a 
multidimensional process, with an emphasis on equality of opportunities for all countries. 
Through a deconstruction of the textual interpretation of Article XXIV, and by analysing the 
practical application of this provision in the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, the 
gradual erosion of development from the process of trade liberalisation will be revealed. This 
article argues that the ‘rationalizing spell’ of legal formalism must be broken in order to 
reinterpret the legal framework, so that a concept of development, grounded in equality, is 
facilitated by the multilateral trading system.  
Introduction 
Regionalism has changed the cartography of international trade over the past two decades, with 
the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) proliferating at an unprecedented rate. In part 
a symptom of the suspended Doha Development Round, regionalism has been perceived as an 
attractive alternative to multilateral trade liberalisation.1 As the political economy of 
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regionalism continues to evolve, regionalism has been perceived as an effective development 
strategy for integrating developing countries into the global economy, and the negotiation of 
North-South regional arrangements has become increasingly common.  
North-South RTAs are regulated by Article XXIV GATT 1947, which requires reciprocity of 
liberalisation among members across ‘substantially all trade’ and within ‘a reasonable period 
of time’. Reciprocity implies a mutual bargaining strategy between nations, and refers to 
‘exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on 
the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good and bad for bad.’2  
However, the extent to which countries may derive benefit from equivalent exchange and 
mutual cooperation is questionable, particularly in the context of reciprocal, albeit asymmetric, 
North-South RTAs. 
Bringing development back to the ‘heart’ of the WTO is a stated objective of the Doha 
Development Agenda.  It is an aim of the Doha Round to ‘ensure that developing countries, 
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.’3 With an increasing number of 
developing countries negotiating regional arrangements with developed countries, the question 
of whether regionalism, in its current construction, facilitates development becomes ever more 
important. Drawing on the work of Amartya Sen and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, this article 
challenges the monocultural doctrine of development as economic growth, and proposes that 
development should be understood as a diverse process for social and economic emancipation. 
Conceptualizing development solely as an economic process obscures the complexities of 
development, both as a process and as a discourse. This article argues that the flourishing of 
regionalism has eroded the concept of equality and freedom in the multilateral system, with 
potentially adverse implications for developing countries. 
Through a deconstruction of Article XXIV, it will be argued that the dominant members of the 
WTO have encouraged a formalist understanding of the legal framework, which has in turn 
restricted negotiating space for developing countries seeking partnership with developed 
countries. Challenging the assumptions on which the legal framework is based, this article 
proposes that the meaning of ‘development’ at the WTO level should be interpreted to promote 
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developed country.  
2 R.O.Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’ 40 (1986) International Organization, 8. 
3 WTO, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’ WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 20 November 2001, para 2. 
 3 
 
values as ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, and not solely economic growth. Until the assumptions on 
which the trading system rest are challenged, developing countries in North-South RTAs could 
stand to lose out on important economic and social opportunities. That the language of Article 
XXIV has been interpreted in a narrow sense is widely acknowledged,4 but the extent to which 
this has negative effects for development (broadly understood) is relatively under-researched. 
There seems little prospect for revision of the GATT, and with increasing emphasis on 
liberalisation in RTAs beyond trade in goods towards broader issues such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and labour standards through 
regional trade, it is time to explore alternative avenues for promoting development.  
One notable shift towards a more inclusive approach to development trade can be seen in the 
EU’s recent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and other bilateral agreements. Since 
the 1990s, the EU has sought to bridge the gap between a purely economic approach to 
liberalisation and the protection of human rights and the environment.5 The shift towards 
‘sustainability’ has been reinforced through the Commissions ‘Europe 2020’ Strategy,6 which, 
through its external trade policy, aims to ‘foster the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating 
poverty.’7 While the WTO rejected the call for a multilateral social clause,8 the inclusion of so-
called ‘social clauses’ and ‘development’ chapters into North-South agreements could offer an 
alternative means through which to realise development in the broad sense.  
This article is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the dominant economic 
ideology underpinning development, as a process and a discourse, facilitated by the rational 
construction of legal analysis perpetuated through WTO jurisprudence and policy. Herein, a 
transformative model of development will be explored, which challenges the orthodox view of 
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(September 2012) Legal Studies Research Paper Series, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Paper No. 
24/2012. 
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lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed on 30 August 2015. 
For a brief synopsis of the 2020 Strategy see: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-
nutshell/index_en.htm 
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22, 61. 
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law and development. The second section provides an overview of the regulatory framework 
governing the creation of regional arrangements and problematizes the concept of regionalism 
as a development strategy. The third section explores the nature of North-South RTAs as 
‘drivers of development’, and with reference to the EPAs negotiated between the EU and 
African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) States, questions the extent to which reciprocal, but 
asymmetric, trade liberalisation facilitates development.  The final section critically reflects on 
the limitations of Article XXIV and examines whether a ‘development-friendly’ approach to 
regional trade, through the inclusion of social clauses and development chapters, is likely to 
promote development in the broad sense.  
I. Constructing Development Through Law  
This section analyses the relationship between law and development, and examines the model 
of development facilitated by the law at the WTO. It is herein submitted that legal reasoning 
can play a defining role in promoting a particular concept of development. At this juncture, it 
is worthwhile reflecting on how the economic model of development has become dominant in, 
and through, legal discourse.  
‘Development’ is generally understood to be both a process and a discourse, but has been 
conceptualized from many theoretical perspectives.9 As a discourse, development comprises a 
set of ‘knowledges, interventions and world views’ although it is neither a ‘benign nor 
innocent’ vision.10 The earliest evidence of development as a discourse is found in moral 
philosophy and ethics,11 but the first significant paradigmatic shift in development theory came 
with the influential work of Adam Smith12 and David Ricardo,13 whose collective work focused 
on the economic value of development. While both Smith and Ricardo promoted the ideology 
of free trade, the concept of comparative advantage was introduced by Ricardo, and this 
remains a cornerstone of the multilateral system today. Development as economic growth has 
evolved over time, shifting from the state-centric vision of classical economics14 to one of 
                                                          
9 For a comprehensive analysis of theories of development, see: V. Desai & R.B.Potter (eds) The Companion to 
Development Studies (3rd edition, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014). 
10 J. D. Sidaway, ‘Post-Development’ in V. Desai & R.B.Potter (eds) The Companion to Development Studies 
(3rd edition, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014), 227. 
11 Early ethical inquiry associated development as achieving a state of ‘happiness’ and living ‘the good life.’ For 
example, a concept of development can be seen in Aristotlean virtue ethics in his concept of eudaimonia. See: C. 
Cordner ‘Aristotlean Virtue and Its Limitations’ (1994) Philosophy 69:269, 291-316. 
12 A.Smith, Wealth of Nations (London: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 2012) first published 1776. 
13 D.Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Dover: Dover Publications, 2004), first 
published 1817.  
14 For a comprehensive overview of classical theory, see: J. Ravenhill, Global Political Economy (3rd edition, 
Oxford: OUP, 2011). 
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minimal state intervention advocated by liberalism.15 Rejecting the ethical notions of 
development as freedom, economic models promote a shared vision of development focused 
on production, efficiency and wealth maximization through the functioning of markets.  
A notable shift in economic development theory came in the 1970s, with the concept of ‘market 
fundamentalism’, a theory based on the assumption that free markets will encourage an 
efficient allocation of resources, becoming increasingly fashionable. In recent times, we have 
witnessed an increasing differentiation within the global economy and a growing number of 
international institutions16 has made the question of ‘who governs’ ever more complex. 
Institutions have assumed a central position in the global order and set ‘the rules of the game 
of society’17 providing a framework for efficient production, ensuring the maximization of 
capital and investment flows. Market fundamentalism, as a development strategy, was 
crystallised through the Washington Consensus,18which was a programme of economic reform 
focusing on macroeconomic stabilization, free trade and market integration. Although 
‘neoliberalism’ is itself a contested concept19 it broadly refers to a set of economic policies and 
prescriptions that have become the dominant ideology over the past twenty-five years. 
Neoliberalism proposes that power and wealth are concentrated in multinational corporations 
and transnational networks.20 The role of the state is minimal, with intervention in the global 
economy from government agencies considered to be most undesirable.21 The pursuit of 
economic freedom is key, with institutional frameworks ‘characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade.’22 
                                                          
15 For an account of liberalism and multilateralism, see: A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics’ (1997) International Organisation 51:4, 513-566. 
16 Robert Keohane, a leading liberal institutionalist, defines an ‘institution’ as a ‘general pattern or 
categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organised”. 
See R.O.Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’ (1988) 32 International Studies Quarterly 386. 
17 D.C.North ‘The new institutional economics and Third World Development’ in J. Harris, J.Hunter & 
C.M.Lewis (eds) The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge, 1995), 
23. 
18 The term was first coined by American economist, John Williamson, to describe these economic 
prescriptions. Over time, the term has become associated with the broader neoliberal trade agenda, in spite of 
Williamson’s objections.  
19 There is no single definition of ‘neoliberalism’ and it is not a homogenous philosophy. For an excellent 
overview of the differing accounts of neoliberal thought, see: A.Saad-Filho & D.Johnston, Neoliberalism: A 
Critical Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 
20 A. Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford: OUP, 
2011). 
21 R. Munck ‘Neoliberalism and Politics, and the Politics of Neoliberalism’ in A.Saad-Filho & D.Johnston, 
Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 60-69. See also, R.Nozick, Anarchy, State and 
Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). 
22 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 2. 
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With the growing prominence of international institutions came a renewed interest in the 
relationship between law and development. Scholars of law and development propose that the 
legal reforms can be used as a ‘development strategy.’23 The dominant view, known as the 
‘economic’ or ‘instrumentalist’ approach, is perhaps best articulated by Max Weber, one of the 
founding fathers of modern sociological thought. Weber explored different archetypes, or 
‘ideal types’, of law which would support and facilitate economic production and noted that 
the rationalization of law created a more predictable and stable environment. A lack of 
rationality implies a state of chaos under which capitalism would collapse. Central to Weber’s 
thesis is the concept of authority, and in the legal-rational typology of law authority is found in 
the impartiality of legal rationality and officials act with ‘formalistic impersonality’.  
Weber proposes that economic forces only indirectly affect the legal system and in this sense, 
the law is relatively autonomous. Law is related to, but not determined by, economic forces. 
Formally rational law is a precondition of capitalism because it provides the necessary certainty 
and predictability required for efficient production, because a capitalist market requires 
certainty and stability. In Protestant Ethic, his work culminates in the haunting analogy to an 
‘iron cage’ enclosing society once we reach an extreme state of rationalization, whereby society 
loses its sense of meaning and freedom. Legal formalism understands the role of law not only 
as establishing legal doctrines which maintain the ‘distribution of economic and political 
power’ but as ‘actively promot[ing] legal redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups 
in society.’24 The law, when interpreted in a formal way, is considered to be predictable, 
inflexible and self-contained. To this end, legal formalism can serve to facilitate, reinforce and 
exacerbate power asymmetry between regional partners. 
That the WTO and other global institutions adopt a neoliberal ideology is self-evident. Over 
time, the economic measure of development has become the norm of international financial 
institutions and since the late 1940s, the global financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have used the measure of ‘gross domestic product’ 
(GDP) per capital to determine the development status of every country. The World Bank 
classifies countries as ‘high-income’, ‘middle income’, ‘low-middle income’ and ‘low-
income’, depending on their measure of GDP per capita.25 In the WTO, it is for each Member 
                                                          
23 M.Trebilcock & M.M.Prado, An Advanced Introduction to Law & Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2014), 47. 
24 M.Horwitz, ‘The Rise of Legal Formalism’ (1975) The American Journal of Legal History, 19:4, 251-264. 
25 Interestingly, the WTO does not provide a classificatory framework and instead allows each country to 
determine its own development status. 
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to determine their own development status, although the World Bank framework remains 
influential.  
a. Breaking the Rationalizing Spell of Law 
Although the dominant economic ideology has become embedded into the international legal 
framework, competing theories of development have emerged which seek to reveal the 
multifaceted nature of development. It is widely acknowledged that the global economy is 
riddled with inequality – political, economic and social - and the polarity of wealth within a 
population, be it local or global, raises issues of distributive justice.26 Challenging the rational 
construction of economic development, neo-Marxist dependency theory proposes that society 
is stratified according to an unequal distribution of wealth. As each group seeks to advance 
their own interest against rival groups, a social structure begins to emerge distinguishing a 
dominant class from the subordinate class. The dominant class seeks to protect its position and 
will use the law as ideology to ensure the social stratification remains intact.27 Law, in this 
sense, becomes an instrumental tool for domination.  
It is argued that market fundamentalism has proven a successful project because for the past 
60 years because we, as a global community, have been led to believe that capitalism is the 
only way for countries to develop. Whether knowingly or not, the concept of development as 
economic growth has become an accepted part of our vernacular. So far, the catastrophic nature 
of capitalism predicted by traditional Marxist thought has been avoided although admittedly, 
there have been notable market failures including the most recent financial crises. Nevertheless, 
we nevertheless remain under the capitalist spell.  
Moving away from the consequentialist theories of justice, Amartya Sen argues that the focus 
of development should be on human capabilities to achieve a life that each individual values 
                                                          
26 Utilitarianism conceptualizes development as a measure of maximizing utility. Developed primarily through 
the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill classical utilitarianism is a theory of distributive justice where 
the state is warranted for maximizing human “well-being”. When the balance of pleasure over pain is as great as 
it can be this is maximizing social utility. Utilitarianism deals with the sum total rather than the distribution at the 
micro-level and therefore arguably it does not respect rights of everyone, but just the majority. For Rawls, 
development is rooted in social contract and requires the redistribution of ‘primary goods’ in accordance with the 
‘difference principle’ to ensure that the least advantaged in society are looked after. Under a Rawlsian framework, 
individual liberty is given lexical priority over equality but nevertheless, redistribution of assets is a key part of a 
functioning society. His theory is procedural in nature, concerned with the processes necessary to promote a more 
equitable distribution of wealth within society. But, much like the libertarian school, Rawls’ theory of justice fails 
to address the consequences that flow from his procedural approach. 
27 A.Hunt, ‘Problems of the State: Law, State and Class Struggle’ (1976) Marxism Today 178-187. 
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and, in order to do so, the means to realizing substantive freedom must be established.28 
Contesting the instrumentalist view that places emphasis on contractual obligations and 
property rights, this approach proposes that the rule of law may be considered to be both a 
‘means’ to development but also a ‘justified end’ of development. Bridging the schools of 
ethics and economics, Amartya Sen proposes a theory of development where freedom is both 
the principal means and end of development.29 Moving against the orthodox instrumentalist 
view that assumes economic growth will promote other substantive freedoms, Sen argues that 
these values should be seem as primary goals which will in turn stimulate growth. Development 
is conceptualized as ‘a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy’30with 
economic growth perceived as a ‘means’ towards the realization of those substantive freedoms. 
Agency plays a central role in Sen’s concept of development, with his ‘capability approach’ 
offering an alternative to neoclassical economic thought. A theory of welfare economics, Sen’s 
approach is rooted in the idea that each individual has the capability to achieve the type of life 
that they value.  
Sen identifies five types of distinct, but interrelated, freedoms that advance the capabilities of 
a person: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, 
and protective security.31 Development as a process should play an instrumental role in 
promoting these freedoms so that people can have lives that they value: 
‘Expanding the freedoms that we have reason to value not only makes our lives richer 
and more unfettered, but also allows us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own 
volitions and interacting with – and influencing – the world in which we live.’32 
Experience has shown that promoting economic freedom can, in fact, lead to substantive 
unfreedom(s). For example, Angola is classified as an ‘upper-middle’ income country by the 
World Bank because of its huge income generated by oil revenues each year. This implies 
significant economic freedom. However, the Multidimensional Poverty Index shows that 
approximately 77 percent of the Angolan population live below the povery line,33which 
suggests the majority of the population experience substantial unfreedoms. This illustrates the 
                                                          
28 M. Nussbaum, ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice’ (2003) Feminist Economics 
9, 33. 
29 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 2001).  
30 Ibid, 3. 
31 Ibid, 10. 
32 Ibid, 16-17. 
33 Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), ‘Country Briefing: Angola’ (July 2010) available 
at <www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Angola.pdf> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
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danger of conceptualizing development through a purely economic lens because it leads to a 
skewed vision of the nature of development.34  
This leads us to the question of what role international economic law can play in promoting the 
realization of not only economic freedom, but social and political freedom. Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger proposes that the role of the legal thinker is to develop a theory of law that 
does ‘justice to social-democratic commitments’.35 While the practice of judicial precedent 
does not formally operate at the WTO’s dispute settlement system, the jurisprudence of the 
DSB suggests that disputes are decided on the basis of analogy. This historically situated 
method of legal reasoning is widely practiced across the world, for example in the United States 
and the United Kingdom,36with the objective of reducing anomaly and legal indeterminacy. 
Rational reconstruction of legal analysis through this method constrains the possibility for 
imaginative reinterpretation of legal principles and doctrines, perceiving anomalous principles 
as ‘mistaken’ and ‘intellectual and political threats rather than intellectual and political 
opportunities’.37 This article argues that the method of legal analysis in the WTO is rationally 
constructed, and restricts the possibility for transformative discovery of alternative legal 
methods. 
Acknowledging the constraints of historically situated legal analysis, and abandoning the 
assumptions of neoliberalism, enables alternative visions of development to be explored. This 
article does not deny the importance of economic growth as an integral part of any model of 
development; rather, it argues that economic value is not the sole factor of development, nor 
should it necessarily take priority over other considerations. As outlined above in the case of 
Angola, the experience of many developing countries is one of struggle – a struggle to eradicate 
inequality and to overcome the crises created from a lack of resources. Economic development 
simply cannot be facilitated in such environments. Exploring alternative perspectives 
emancipates us from our existing bounded understanding of law and development. Revealing 
the unfreedoms perpetuated by the multilateral trading system, and in particular exploring the 
implications of economic unfreedom for developing countries, enables the discourse of 
development to be transformed.  
                                                          
34 Nevertheless, there are some success stories of how an emphasis on aggressive economic liberalization can 
lift people out of poverty. For example, the East Asian ‘Tigers’ have experienced unprecedented growth through 
the adoption of unilateral liberalization policies. 
35 R.M.Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (London: Verso,1996), 35. 
36 C.Sunstein, ‘On Analogical Reasoning’ 106 (1993) Harvard Law Review, 741.  
37 See Unger, above n30, 40. 
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For a more inclusive vision of development to be accepted, one that shifts the focus away from 
development as a purely economic process, to one that reveals the emancipatory potential of 
development as a process of freedom and equality for those participating in the multilateral 
trading system, the legal framework needs to be reinterpreted. However, as this article argues, 
revision of the GATT is simply not on the agenda. To overcome the inherent development 
deficit of Article XXIV, and against the backdrop of a formalist legal framework, alternative 
means through which development as freedom can be promoted are required. Alternative 
measures may include the inclusion of social clauses and development chapters, provided that 
they are not couched in ambiguous terms, and this will be considered later in this article. In the 
following section, the legal bases of regionalism will be explored and the assumptions on which 
the legal framework will be revealed.  
II. Regionalism as a Development Strategy 
Regionalism as a development strategy has been a stated goal of the WTO, as noted at the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference: 
‘…trade relations of WTO Members are being increasingly influenced by regional trade 
agreements, which have expanded vastly in number, scope and coverage. Such 
initiatives can promote further liberalisation and may assist least-developed, developing 
and transition economies in integrating into the international trading system.’38 
Regionalism presents both opportunities and challenges to the multilateral trading system and 
the broader international order. In short, RTAs offer ‘speed and flexibility’39in trade 
liberalization, although the rules relating to RTA formation are ambiguous, particularly in 
relation to North-South RTAs. This section explores the historically situated nature of the legal 
rules, and proposes that the formalist interpretation of Article XXIV has resulted in a 
legalisation, and rational construction, of regionalism.  
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 provides the legal basis for creating regional agreements, 
where at least one member of the regional group is a developing country. It permits derogation 
from the principles of MFN and non-discrimination on the assumption that trade will be 
increased by promoting the regional interdependence of countries, through customs unions and 
                                                          
38 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted 13 December 1996 (WT/MIN(96)/DEC). 
39 R.V.Fiorentino, J.Crawford & C.Toqueboeuf, ‘The Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements and WTO 
Surveillance’ in R.Baldwin & P.Low (eds) Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading 
System (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 29. 
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free trade areas. Article XXIV:4 sets out, in purposive language, the general philosophy on 
regionalism in the multilateral trading system: 
‘[WTO] Members recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the 
economies of countries parties to such agreements. They also recognise that the purpose 
of a customs union or a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the 
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other [WTO] Members 
with such territories.’ 
Regionalism has therefore been conceptualized as a means towards ‘freedom’, through closer 
integration between Members. However, in the following two sections it will be shown that the 
rational construction of regionalism tends to increase economic freedom for the most powerful 
Members of the group, be it a customs union or a free trade area (FTA). This serves to 
exacerbate existing power disparity in the multilateral order. Customs unions are created where 
the Members liberalise trade internally while maintaining a common external tariff with all 
non-Members.40  FTAs exist where Members liberalise trade internally but maintain their own 
individual external barriers to non-Members.41 As there is no harmonised external policy with 
non-Members, rules of origin (ROO) become important policy instruments for preventing the 
transhipment of goods and trade deflection.42 To date, the majority of North-South RTAs are 
FTAs. 
Defined in Article XXIV:8, the creation of a customs union or free trade area requires 
liberalisation of ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce…with respect to 
substantially all the trade’ between members.43 However, the legal text does not provide any 
guidance as to what constitutes a ‘restrictive regulation of commerce’44 or ‘substantially all 
trade’.  The scope of Article XXIV was examined by the panel and Appellate Body in the 
                                                          
40 Article XXIV:5(a) in relation to customs unions states that ‘The duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution…shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such 
union…’. 
41 Article XXIV:5(b) provides that ‘…the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade areas…shall not be higher or more 
restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
territory prior to the formation of the free-trade area…’ 
42 P.Krishna ‘Understanding Rules of Origin’ in A. Estevadeordal, O.Cadot, A. Suwa-Eisenmann & T.Verdier 
(eds), The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 20. 
43 Article XXIV:8(a) and Aricle XXIV:8(b), emphasis added. 
44 For a discussion of the potential implications of the interpretation of Article XXIV:5(a) in relation to ‘other 
restrictive regulations of commerce’ for developing countries, see V.Mosoti, ‘Africa in the First Decade of 
WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2006) JIEL 9, 449. 
 12 
 
Turkey-Textiles dispute, and although the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement was not directly 
at issue in the case, the Appellate body made some notable comments on this aspect of the 
provision. It explained that ‘substantially all trade’ is ‘not the same as all the trade, and…is 
something considerably more than merely some of the trade.’45 Furthermore, the Appellate 
Body noted that Article XXIV is ‘flexible’ but that its flexibility is limited by the requirement 
that ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ be eliminated with respect to 
‘substantially all trade’.46 While Article XXIV has been invoked as a defence in subsequent 
cases, such as Argentina – Footwear47and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres48, there has been no further 
clarification offered as to what will satisfy the conditions of Article XXIV. 
The failure to explicitly define what constitutes ‘substantially all trade’ has resulted in 
uncertainty as to the legal parameters of this internal requirement.49 Historically, the EU 
proposed a benchmark figure of 80 percent liberalisation as satisfying the requirement during 
its dialogue with the Overseas Association.50 Today, the EU defines ‘substantially all trade’ as 
constituting 80-90 percent of liberalisation,51 as evidenced in the recently negotiated EPAs.52 
Australia, on the other hand, offers a more ambitious interpretation and proposes that 95 
percent of tariff lines should be liberalised in order to satisfy the ‘substantially all trade’ 
requirement.53 Such divergent approaches create confusion and uncertainty as to what properly 
constitutes a legally compliant level of liberalisation.54  
                                                          
45 Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, 
adopted 19 November 1999, para 48. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC),  Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R adopted on 12 January 2000. 
48 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
WT/DS332/AB/R,  adopted on 17 December 2007. 
49 See: K.Dam, ‘Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The Legacy of a Misconception’ (1963) 30 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 615-665; J.Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: 
Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement (TMC Asser Press: The Hague, 2002); J.T.Gathii, African 
Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (Cambridge: CUP, 2011); J.Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading 
System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
50 ; J.Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement 
(TMC Asser Press: The Hague, 2002), 67. 
51 In practice, the EU calls for approximately 90 percent liberalization overall between the Members. In the case 
of the Trade Development Cooperation Agreement, between the EU and South Africa, the EU liberalized 
98percent of tariffs while South Africa liberalized 82 percent, to bring the overall total level of liberalisation to 
90 percent.  
52 Traidcraft, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements: Building or Shattering African Regional Integration?’ 
Traidcraft Report (May 2007), available at: 
<http://www.stopepa.de/img/traidcraft_etal_building_or_shattering.pdf> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
53 WTO, Communication from Australia, Addendum, WT/REG/W/22/Add.1, 24 April 1998. 
54 Reading Article XXIV in light of its associated Understanding suggests that sectoral exclusion is not 
permitted. The Preamble to the Understanding recognises the contribution of RTAs to the expansion of world 
trade is ‘diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded.’ 
 13 
 
Although the jurisprudence relating to Article XXIV is limited, it does offer some insight into 
the interpretive dimension of this provision and suggests a gradual ‘legalization’ and 
rationalization of Article XXIV.55 The implication of this is that, for many years now, WTO 
Members have been creating RTAs without knowing whether they are, sensu stricto, compliant 
with the legal framework.56  
Article XXIV rests on the assumption that trade is reciprocal: countries each agree to open their 
markets to one another, on the basis that ‘substantially all trade’ is liberalized within that that 
regional space. In trade terms, the word ‘reciprocity’ implies granting mutual concessions with 
equally beneficial gains to be made by all. The construction of this term assumes homogeneity 
of production potential and opportunity, overlooking the socio-economic reality of 
development among vastly heterogenous trading states. That said, it has historically been 
practice in North-South cooperation for developed countries to offer preferential access to their 
markets for developing countries. The legal basis for non-reciprocal and preferential treatment 
was rooted in the idea that the ‘rich’ can help the ‘poor’ through some kind of ‘welfare 
obligation’ at the multilateral level.57  This was the dominant ideology in the post-colonial 
GATT policy and has characterised North-South relations to the current day. Rather than 
helping developing countries integrate into the global economy, preferential trade deepened 
post-colonial dependencies and further isolated developing countries from the rest of the 
globalising world. 
The legitimacy of non-reciprocal terms of trade was challenged in the long-running, and now 
infamous, EC-Bananas dispute.58 Developing countries are now under greater pressure to 
negotiate ‘WTO compatible’ agreements, albeit the true meaning of this concept has become 
increasingly obfuscated. Given that there is uncertainty as to what constitutes ‘substantially all 
trade’, coupled with the fact that the trade relationship should be based on reciprocal, albeit 
asymmetric, non-preferential terms, it is perhaps unsurprising that there are concerns relating 
to the nature of ‘North-South’ RTAs notified under Article XXIV. The shift from non-
                                                          
55 J. Mathis ‘The ‘Legalization’ of GATT Article XXIV – Can Foes Become Friends?’ in K. Bagwell and P. 
Mavroidis (eds), Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
56 For a comprehensive discussion of how Article XXIV is interpreted in practice, see: South Centre, ‘Article 
XXIV and RTAs: How Much Wriggle Room for Developing Countries?’ Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/RTA, 
December 2008.  
57 R. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, 2nd edition (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
58 Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R. 
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reciprocity to reciprocal trade is a huge step for developing countries that have become reliant 
on the preferential treatment they have received to date.  
Reciprocity is not necessarily synonymous with equality and fairness, especially in the context 
of North-South RTAs where one party is likely to be in a dominant position vis-à-vis the other 
Members. Hegemony poses a challenge to the project of regionalism.59 In the context of North-
South regional arrangements, where cooperation exists between actors of different geographic 
scale and economic strength, it is often the weaker actor (developing countries) that will make 
the greatest concessions. Inevitably, this perpetuates power asymmetry and unequal 
partnerships.60 Within a regional configuration, hegemons are pivotal to the direction of the 
regional agenda and it is likely to seek to ‘construct an international order in some form, 
presumably along lines that are compatible with its own international objectives and domestic 
structures.’61 To this end, the regional arrangement is perceived by the hegemon to be within 
its ‘sphere of influence’ and it will seek to underwrite the implementation of its regional 
objectives.62 
Hegemonic RTAs can be perceived to be an attempt to circumvent the rule-making at the 
multilateral level, with dominant members seeking to create a new system of rules at the 
regional or bilateral level. At the heart of the WTO system is the notion that all countries stand 
to gain from trade, although some will be more likely to gain than others. In an Orwellian sense, 
they are ‘all equal but some are more equal than others’. RTAs may be used as a policy tool 
for WTO Members to reassert their position and control in the global economy. Negotiating 
RTAs therefore carries with it the real risk of reinforcing and perpetuating structural 
inequalities between trade partners.  
In the following section, cooperation under the Economic Partnership Agreements will be 
discussed. The EPAs are reciprocal North-South RTAs, negotiated between the EU and ACP 
countries, designed to ‘kick-start reform and help strengthen rule of law in the economic field, 
                                                          
59 This paper uses the term ‘hegemony’ in a Gramscian sense, referring to the domination of one class over 
another. This approach understands hegemonic authority as being exercised through a combination of coercive 
and persuasive practices that allows a leader to rule with the consent of the subjugated classes.  
60 W.J.Ethier, ‘The New Regionalism’ (1998) The Economic Journal 108:449, 1151. 
61 J.G.Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalism (London: Routledge, 
1998), 25. 
62 A. Habib & N. Selinyane, ‘Constraining the unconstrained: civil society and South Africa’s hegemonic 
obligations in Africa’ cited in I.Taylor ‘South African ‘Imperialism’ in a region lacking Regionalism: A 
Critique’ (2011) Third World Quarterly 32:7, 1233-1253. 
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thereby attracting foreign direct investment, so helping to create a ‘virtuous circle’ of growth.’63 
By problematizing the scope and application of Article XXIV in the context of these 
agreements, the following section seeks to problematize the extent to which North-South RTAs 
promote development as a diverse process. 
III. North-South RTAs as ‘drivers of development’? 
Following the decision of EC-Bananas III, but keen to preserve its long-standing relationship 
with its former colonies, the EU offered reciprocal but asymmetric preferences under the 
Cotonou Agreement and, more specifically, through the EPAs. The primary purpose of the 
EPAs is to eradicate poverty and facilitate the gradual integration of ACP countries into the 
global economy through the project of regionalism.64 These agreements mark an important 
paradigmatic shift in cooperation between the EU and ACP since trade facilitation and 
reciprocal market access are key pillars of the framework.  
Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement, in defining the scope of the EPAs, provides: 
‘The partnership shall be centered on the objective of reducing and eventually 
eradicating poverty consistent with the objective of sustainable development and the 
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.’ (emphasis added)  
This resonates with the EU’s external policy, as Article 130u TEU requires that Members 
‘foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them.’65 Promoting human rights and democracy 
through trade has been part of the EU’s external policy since the early 1990s. Social clause 
have been integrated into FTAs as part of the effort to eradicate the harmful effects of ‘social 
dumping’ associated with globalisation and trade liberalisation.66 By promoting a 
‘development friendly’ approach to trade, social clauses are becoming more commonplace in 
FTAs so as to regulate against the potentially harmful social effects stemming from trade 
liberalisation.  
                                                          
63 European Commission DG Trade, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’ (undated) available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/economic-partnerships/>. (emphasis 
added) 
64 Article 1 Cotonou Partnership Agreement OJ/L/317 (15 December 2000) as amended by the consolidated 
version OJ/L/287 (4 November 2010).  
65 Emphasis added. 
66 While there is no single definition of ‘social dumping’, the term generally refers to the practice of multinational 
corporations that ‘off-shore’ production to developing countries, where labour costs are considerably lower and 
the labour standards are often less restrictive than those in the home state. See: I. Hurtado & P.Argerey, ‘Social 
Dumping: The Debate on a Multilateral Social Clause’ (2008) 8 Global Economy Article 6, 2. 
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The legal bases for the incorporation of social clauses into FTAs is found in Article 21 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which states: 
  ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the UN Charter 
and international law’ (emphasis added). 
Collectively, these provisions shows that the EU’s development policy incorporates the terms 
‘poverty’ and ‘sustainable development’ as the ends of the development process. However, this 
is seemingly at odds with the EU’s concept of development as a discourse, which is narrowly 
focused on economic growth. For example, in its second draft submission to the WTO 
Negotiating Group on Rules, the EU emphasised the ‘development dimension’ of RTAs but 
states that regionalism can ‘play an important role in promoting economic development in so 
far as the agreements are sufficiently ambitious and take into account the specific needs and 
constraints of developing and least developed countries.’67 A disconnect between the EU’s 
concept of development as a discourse and of development as a process is palpable. 
EU development policy has long echoed that of the global financial institutions, and the EU 
perceives its development policy to be complementary to its trade strategy, each being seen as 
‘two facets of the EU’s external identity.’68 Much like the recent policies of the IMF and World 
Bank, the Cotonou Agreement encourages developing countries to ‘own’ their development 
process and to coordinate strategies to help eradicate poverty.69 Political dialogue is an 
important element of the Cotonou Agreement and discussion on agreed priorities, shared 
agendas and issues of common interest, should be facilitated.70 A key part of this strategy is to 
foster the ‘smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy.’71 
However, as development levels vary significantly across ACP countries reciprocal 
liberalization must be phased in gradually.72 
                                                          
67 European Commission, ‘Second Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the European Communities’ 
Brussels, 26 April 2005, 2. 
68 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the 
eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership’ COM (96) 750 Final (1996), 3. 
69 Article 2 Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
70 Article 8 Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
71 Article 34(1) Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
72 Article 34(2) Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
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Reciprocity in the EU-ACP relationship benefits the EU significantly as, for the first time in 
its trade history, the EU will enjoy duty-free-quota-free access to ACP markets. This 
arrangement confers greater access than that granted under Lomé, where preferences were 
based on MFN or better, depending on the particular product. The EPAs overlap with existing 
regional initiatives, and requiring liberalization of ‘substantially all trade’ among an existing 
regional arrangement may cause friction between its members, as they try to agree which 
products should be included and excluded from the EPA. There is the possibility that each 
member of the regional configuration will select different products for liberalization in order 
to protect their respective ‘sensitive’ sectors.73 Even where the same products are selected, 
complications could arise if different phase in periods are permitted for each country.  
From the EU’s perspective, the very fact that the EPAs ‘lock-in’ ACP countries to binding 
regulations and extensive liberalization makes them ‘development friendly’ instruments. 
Furthermore, the EPAs, like many regional arrangements currently negotiated with the EU,74 
go beyond trade to include human rights clauses, social clauses, and labour standards. Creating 
a more stable economic environment that is more attractive to investors is a key goal of the 
EPAs. As confidence among investors grow and the financial environment stabilizes, it is 
expected that investment flows to the region will significantly increase. This investment cycle 
is one of the dynamic effects of the EPA structure. However, appropriate trade conditions will 
need to be in place to stimulate shifts in the patterns of investment and production in order to 
realise these effects. To this end, the extent to which the EPAs will stimulate investment in real 
terms is ambiguous. That the EPA will result in domestic ACP producers being ‘crowded out’ 
by more efficient EU producers keen to harness these potential economies of scale remains a 
real fear.75 Nevertheless, economic growth and integration remain the key objectives of these 
agreements, while the promotion of other social rights is only a peripheral concern. 
                                                          
73 C. Stevens, ‘The EU, Africa and EPAS: Unintended Consequences of Policy Leverage’ (2006) Journal of 
Modern African Studies 44, 445. 
74 For example, in its recently negotiated FTAs, the EU has incorporated ‘sustainable development’ chapters and 
social clauses in to the EU-Korea, EU-India and EU-Central America agreements. 
75 For example, see: ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Replies Given to the Commission To Oral 
Questions’ 22nd Session of 21-23 November 2011, available at: < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/replies_lome_/replies_lome_en.pdf > 
accessed on 20 March 2015; S.N.Karingi, ‘Interim Economic Partnership Agreements Point to the Classic 
Regional Trade Agreements After All: Should African Countries Really Be Worried?’ African Trade Policy 
Centre Working Paper No.75 (April 2009); D. Cronin, ‘EU Deals with Africa Could Violate Rights’ IPS online 
article (5 October 2007) available at: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/10/trade-eu-deals-with-africa-could-
violate-rights/> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
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EPAs have been perceived to be controversial development tools because they require 
liberalization beyond that prescribed by the WTO. Since the negotiations began in 2004, the 
EU has pushed for the inclusion of so-called ‘new generation’ issues which includes 
liberalization of services, competition policy and investment policy.76 The reluctance of 
developing countries to liberalise beyond trade in goods is well documented, culminating in 
the suspension of the Doha Round.77 Failure to adopt a more aggressive liberalization policy 
could result in an undiversified production base in developing countries, where production is 
already predominantly monocultural. If supported in a meaningful way, liberalization into other 
sectors could open vast opportunities for developing countries in the ACP. The inclusion of 
‘new generation’ issues leaves ACP countries in a precarious negotiating space but given the 
lacklustre growth experienced under Lomé, it seems indisputable that trade facilitation needs 
to move beyond tariff reduction for trade in goods. 
It has been estimated that the adjustment costs for implementing the EPA framework will 
amount to at least €9 billion for the ACP.78 Under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), 
the ACP received approximately €650 million for the provision of trade related assistance, In 
spite of this notable shortfall, the EU Commission insists that there will be no separate financial 
envelope specifically designated for supporting EPA implementation in ACP countries.79 
Furthermore, the Aid for Trade element has been decoupled from the EPAs making any 
additional funding from the EU to implement the new reforms entirely voluntary. This 
substantially alters the dynamics of the trading relationship since the ACP countries will now 
need to implement the proposed institutional reforms and apply for funding without the promise 
of such funding being available. If funding is not guaranteed, the ACP will need to redirect 
their own domestic resources, usually generated through tariff revenues, to finance the 
implementation of the EPAs. Inevitably, the implementation of the EPA will result in less 
revenue generated through tariffs and as such there will be less money available to invest into 
improving infrastructure.  
                                                          
76 A. Young ‘Trade politics ain’t what it used to be’: the European Union in the Doha Round’ (2007) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 45, 789-811. 
77 K.A.Jones, The Doha Blues: Institutional Crisis and Reform in the WTO (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
78 A. Flint, ‘The End of a ‘Special Relationship’? The New EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements’ (2009) 
Review of African Political Economy 36, 80. 
79 ECDPM, ‘EPA Development Support: Possible Scenarios for EPA related support mechanisms’ ECDPM In 
Brief No. 16 (November 2006) available at: < http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/IB-16B-EPA-
Development-Support-Scenarios-EPA-Support-Mechanisms-2006.pdf> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
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In relation to Article XXIV:8, and the requirement to liberalise ‘other restrictive regulations of 
commerce’ for ‘substantially all trade’ in North-South RTAs, there is some concern in relation 
to the incidence of non-tariff barriers to trade. Barriers to trade do not come merely in the form 
of tariffs. Market access tools such as rules of origin, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are among some of the mechanisms that could 
distort trade under the EPAs.80For example, where a developing country or LDC suffers from 
structural and supply constraints they may not be in a position to meet the strict rules of origin 
requirements for exported products. Where this occurs, they will effectively be prevented from 
accessing the EU market on a duty-free-quota-free basis.81 Strict labelling requirements and 
health and safety standards place heavy restrictions on the production base in developing 
countries.82 The Taubira Report, commissioned by the French government during its EU 
Presidency, highlighted the deficiencies of the EPA and called for the European Commissioner 
to reconsider its position.83Taubira argued that the high food safety measures in operation in 
Europe constituted ‘more effective obstacles than tariffs’. However, it seems that little has been 
done to reform these processes at the EU level. 
This article submits that the EPAs, as a regional development strategy, have the potential to 
promote economic unfreedom and erode other substantive freedoms. The projected 
implications of these North-South RTAs appears to go against the meaning of sustainable 
development, but this approach reinforces the EU’s discourse of development as a market-
orientated process. In spite of unrelenting criticism, the European Commission remains 
unapologetic for the proposed scope of liberalization under the EPAs. It continues to see these 
regional arrangements as fundamental to the development process across the ACP, and notes 
that the ‘EPAs are part of the overall effort to build up the economic governance framework, 
the stable transparent and predictable rules necessary to lower the cost of doing business, attract 
fresh domestic or foreign investment and make ACP producers more diversified and 
competitive.’84 
                                                          
80 For a discussion on the impact of non-tariff barriers to trade for developing countries, see: A.Disdier, L. 
Fontagné & M.Mimouni, ‘The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT 
Agreements’ (2008) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90, 336-350. 
81 A.I.Ukpe, ‘Will EPAs Foster the Integration of Africa into World Trade?’ (2010) Journal of African Law, 
54:2, 215.  
82 P.Goodison & C.Stoneman, ‘Europe: Partner or Exploiter? The G-90 and the ACP’ (2004) Review of African 
Political Economy 31, 730. 
83 For a discussion on the Taubira Report and its implications for the EPA negotiations, see: J.Senona, ‘EPAs 
and the Doha Round: Development or Discontent’ (2009) 8(1) Journal of International Trade Policy 60-83. 
84 European Commission cited in A.Storey ‘Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and 
Africa’ (2006) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:3, 341. 
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As North-South RTAs notified under Article XXIV, the EPAs highlight the structural 
inequalities that exist between the EU and the ACP States. The EPAs also serve as an example 
of how dominant members can use regional arrangements to protect their position. By 
participating in RTAs with the EU, the ACP are at risk of becoming ever more dependent on 
its former colonial master: 
‘The risk to the group remains that of perpetuating the unhealthy postcolonial 
dependence on Europe for development aid and fiscal support, which unfortunately 
authors further neoliberal market integration, trade liberalisation and privatisation of 
State-owned enterprises.’85 
There appears to be a real disjuncture between the rhetoric of the EU in terms of its 
development policy, and the manner in which its development policy is executed. Fearing that 
the 2008 negotiating deadline would not be met, the EU offered duty-free-quota-free access to 
those regions negotiating towards full EPAs under EU Regulation 1528/2007.86 It seems to be 
the intention of this Regulation to ‘lock in’ ACP countries into the EPA process. However, the 
EU threatened to withdraw access under the Regulation to eighteen negotiating parties unless 
they took appropriate measures towards ratifying the EPAs by 1 January 2014.87   
The effect of withdrawing preferences under the Regulation would have affected countries in 
different ways, depending on whether they have ‘developing’ or ‘LDC’ status. For LDC 
countries, duty-free-quota-free access would remain available under the EU’s ‘Everything But 
Arms’ Initiative, and some may benefit from the GSP+ programme.88 However, developing 
countries removed from the Annex to the Regulation would have to trade under the revised 
GSP which means that some of their products would be subject to duties. For countries such as 
Namibia and Botswana, classified as ‘upper middle’ income, they fall outside the scope of GSP 
and would therefore have to access the EU market on MFN tariff levels. In real terms, it is 
estimated that this would have cost Namibia almost €60 million per annum, as the EU is its 
                                                          
85 R.Kamidza, ‘SADC EPA Information Seminar Failed Civil Society’ SEATINI Bulletin 10:7 (16 July 2007) 
available at: <http://www.seatini.org/bulletins/pdf/2007/10.07.pdf>. 
86 European Council Regulation No 1528/2007 of 20 December 2007, L/348/1. 
87 See, L.Bartels, ‘Legal Constraints on the EU’s ability to withdraw EPA preferences under Regulation 
1528/2007’ ECDPM Briefing Note No 27 (October 2011) available online at 
<http://ecdpm.org/publications/legal-constraints-eus-ability-to-withdraw-epa-preferences-under-regulation-
15282007/> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
88 For a comprehensive discussion of the EU’s programme of GSP, and relevant documentation, see: European 
Commission, ‘Generalised Scheme of Preferences’ online at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm> accessed on 20 March 2015. 
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largest export destination after South Africa.89 However, the southern African countries have 
managed to negotiate a full EPA and this economic shortfall has been avoided.  
Stephen Hurt explores the degree of consent and coercion present in the EU-ACP relationship 
and argues that the promotion of ‘partnership’ and ‘dialogue’ where the ACP countries ‘own’ 
their development process is little more than a façade. Offering the EPAs as the only alternative 
to Lomé preferences illustrates the power asymmetry in the EU-ACP relationship, and the EU 
has used the WTO legal framework a coercive tool to manipulate that relationship: 
‘The use of the WTO as the major justification is understood not as a simple “reason” 
in this case, but as a strategic attempt by the EU to externalize responsibility for its own 
policy. What has been shown to be an essentially coercive policy direction does not 
require domestic consensus if it can be shown that it is the only alternative.’90 
In spite of its emphasis on partnership, the Cotonou Agreement supports the EU’s neoliberal 
model of development as it stresses the important of ensuring that ‘cooperation’ leads to a 
‘favourable environment for private investment and the development of a dynamic, viable and 
competitive private sector.’91 Furthermore, ‘cooperation’ should support the implementation 
of ‘structural policies designed to reinforce the role of different actors, especially the private 
sector.’92 Of course, the importance of the private sector should not be underestimated in terms 
of stimulating economic development but their role in promoting unfreedoms must not go 
unnoticed.  
IV. Overcoming the development deficit: A way forward? 
The EPA negotiations illustrate the complex nature of liberalization under North-South RTAs, 
and because each Member has a different status of social, economic, and human development, 
each Member is likely to feel the impacts of reciprocal trade differently. Securing special and 
differential treatment, while ensuring that the EPAs were WTO compatible, was a significant 
challenge for the negotiators. The negotiating process has also highlighted the need for 
flexibility in North-South RTAs, to ensure the gradual integration of developing countries into 
the world economy. Developing countries have voiced their concern about the requirement to 
                                                          
89 Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network ‘EU Wants to Force ACP Countries to Sign EPAs’ (undated) 
available online at: < http://aefjn.org/index.php/352/articles/european-commission-wants-to-force-acp-
countries-to-sign-epas.html>. 
90 S. Hurt, ‘Cooperation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement Between the EU and ACP States and the End 
of the Lomé Convention’ (2003) Third World Quarterly 24, 163. 
91 Article 21 Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
92 Article 22 Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
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shift from non-reciprocal preferences to reciprocal trade, and on 28 April 2004, the ACP States 
submitted a proposal to the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules requesting a reinterpretation of 
Article XXIV in relation to North-South RTAs.93  
At the heart of the ACP proposal was the idea that special and differential treatment could 
become a recognised element of the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement and with respect to 
‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’.94 Calling for clarification of the rules relating to 
RTAs, the ACP Group proposed that regionalism should ‘not pose unduly restrictive 
constraints on economic integration efforts of developing countries being pursued as part of 
their fundamental development strategy.’95 The historically situated nature of Article XXIV is 
identified, noting that this provision was negotiated at a time where there were very few, if any, 
North-South RTAs. Noting the ‘de facto flexibility’96 in Article XXIV, the ACP Group argued 
that the lack of a specific SDT element in this provision is detrimental to meaningful 
development in North-South RTAs. The ACP Group proposed that Article XXIV, in the 
context of North-South RTAs, should require less than reciprocity and greater flexibility, by 
explicitly incorporating SDT into the legal framework.97  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, WTO Members rejected the ACP Group’s submission, and in 
particular, Japan stated that the ‘time was not yet ripe’ to engage in this discussion because the 
rules had not yet been clarified in full by the Negotiating Group on Rules.98 While some WTO 
Negotiating Group on Rules noted that some Members believed Article XXIV should 
incorporate the ‘least amount of flexibility’ because it is an exception to the fundamental 
principle of MFN. Interestingly, in footnote 1 to the submission, Japan states that it considers 
all negotiating parties to be on ‘equal footing’ when it negotiates RTAs, and therefore ‘there is 
little room for S&D treatment’.99 
                                                          
93 ACP Submission, ‘Development aspects of regional trade agreements and special and differential treatment in 
WTO rules: GATT 1994 Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause’ TN/RL/W/155 of 28 April 2004. For a 
comprehensive discussion of this Proposal and of the responses received from the WTO Negotiating Group on 
Rules, see: B.Onguglo and T. Ito, ‘In Defence of the ACP Submission on Special and Differential Treatment in 
GATT Article XXIV’ ECPDM Discussion Paper No. 67 (October 2005). 
94 In their submission, the ACP States also requested that special and differential treatment be incorporated into 
the procedural aspects of RTAs, such as notification to the CRTA.  
95 ACP submission, see above n 88, para 3. 
96 Ibid, para 8. 
97 Ibid, para 10-12. 
98 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘Submission on Regional Trade Agreements: Japan Comments on the 
ACP Paper TN/RL/W/155’, TN/RL/W/165 of 8 October 2004, para 1. 
99 Ibid, n 1. 
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The dialogue between WTO Members at an early stage of the EPA negotiations demonstrates 
a willingness to preserve the historically situated analysis of Article XXIV and suggests that 
the proposal to reinterpret Article XXIV was a threat to the existing mantra of the WTO. This 
article has sought to highlight that the meaning of Article XXIV, and the ‘substantially all 
trade’ requirement, has been rationally constructed on the basis of historically situated 
discussions and Members have been unwilling to adopt alternative interpretations. 
Furthermore, the textual approach of the Dispute Settlement Body in the interpretation of 
Article XXIV has limited the negotiating space of developing countries in North-South RTAs. 
Without a major modification to the language of Article XXIV through a renegotiation of the 
GATT, there seems little opportunity for redefining this provision in a way that embodies a 
more inclusive concept of development. The reluctance of Members to engage in meaningful 
discussions about the challenges posed by the inflexible language of the GATT, and to explore 
alternative interpretations, is merely symptomatic of the formalist system under which the legal 
framework has been negotiated.    
Arguably, the definitional boundaries of Article XXIV may not perceived to be a crucial 
concern in North-South negotiations. Given the lack of jurisprudence in the DSB, Members 
can rely on the lack of clarity to ask for longer phase in periods and less coverage. However, 
significant power disparity between WTO Members continues to exist. This leads us to 
question what alternative might be used to embed freedom within the trade paradigm. One such 
alternative is to link trade concessions to international standards on human rights and labour 
standards through the inclusion of social clauses. The debate on social clauses has existed since 
the Seattle Ministerial Conference, and while some WTO Members are seeking to include 
social clauses and development chapters into North-South FTAs, the effect of these measures 
for development remains ambiguous.100  
The CARIFORUM EPA, for example, is coined as a ‘Trade Partnership for Sustainable 
Development’, and sets its first objective as ‘contributing to the reduction and eventual 
eradication of poverty through the establishment of a trade partnership consistent with the 
objective of sustainable development.’101 However, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ 
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is itself vague102 and the EU’s approach towards development lacks coherence. In short, the 
question remains as to whether the inclusion of development objectives goes beyond mere 
rhetoric. The extent to which social clauses and development chapters improve standards in the 
developing country setting has been subject to scrutiny for some time.103 Enforcement of these 
rights also remains contentious, with some arguing that social provisions in EU FTAs are to be 
treated as ‘objectives to be achieved’, rather than legally binding commitments.104 This 
certainly appears to be the case in the context of the EPAs. Given the EU’s aggressive trade 
agenda and ambiguous development model, this is perhaps unsurprising.105 The treatment of 
these provisions, and the extent to which EPA countries seek to rely on their terms, is yet to be 
seen. If we are to see a real shift in the development discourse, there needs to be a correlative 
shift in legal discourse.  
Concluding Remarks 
This article has shown that the neoliberal economic paradigm, which is supported by a formalist 
legal framework, is seemingly at odds with the discourse of development as freedom. That 
said, important lessons should be learned from the EPA negotiations.  
This paper sought to problematize the concept of regionalism as a development strategy by 
drawing attention to the assumptions on which the concept has been constructed. The legal 
framework has been narrowly defined, which has served the purpose of reinforcing narrow 
conceptions of development as a neoliberal discourse. Although special and differential 
treatment is a core part of the WTO architecture, Article XXIV is couched in neutral terms and 
as such does not incorporate a ‘development’ dimension. While the ACP issued a 
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communique106 to the WTO members calling for Article XXIV to be redrafted in a way that 
incorporates SDT elements,107 this has so far proven fruitless. 
There is no consensus as to what Article XXIV, and in particular paragraph 8, requires for the 
creation of a regional arrangement. Furthermore, the jurisprudence from the Dispute Settlement 
Body shows the reluctance of the Panel and Appellate Body to engage in any meaningful 
dialogue about what conditions must be met in order to meet the requirements of Article XXIV. 
This article has shown that the legal framework fails to take into account the qualitative nature 
of regionalism and does not provide flexibility to accommodate for complex social processes 
that constitute regional processes. That various RTAs have been granted status without coming 
close to meeting the spirit of Article XXIV further illustrates the formalist approach embedded 
at the multilateral level.  Adopting a formalist interpretation of the text of Article XXIV creates 
rigid boundaries which constrains the choices Members can make when negotiating new 
regional spaces.  
It is generally accepted that the language of Article XXIV is of ‘sub-optimal clarity’108 and this 
paper proposes that Article XXIV should be reinterpreted in a way that accommodates for 
greater flexibility in terms of market liberalisation for developing countries in ‘North-South 
RTAs. In light of the ongoing challenges facing the multilateral system post-Bali, it seems 
unlikely that the WTO members would reach a consensus on redrafting Article XXIV with a 
development dimension.  
The deleterious effects of regionalism as a development strategy are being felt by ACP 
countries in the EPA negotiations with the EU. Conceptualised as ‘drivers of development’ it 
appears that these North-South RTAs perpetuate economic and social unfreedoms while 
deepening existing structures of dependency. Whether the EPAs are a modern form of 
‘economic recolonization’ is open for debate, but there is certainly an ‘imperial flavour’ to the 
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new trade regime.109This article has argued that trade can lead to emancipation but we need to 
break free from the yokes of market-based assumptions in order to realise substantive 
freedoms. Opening our eyes to other possibilities is the only way to transform the law and 
development discourse. 
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